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Abstract 
 
Sharing relevant information between suppliers and buyers can improve food safety 
performance of supply chains, but only when it is reliable. This paper investigates reliability 
of food chain information reported by finishing pig producers about antibiotics usage in pigs 
during 60 days prior to delivery to a Dutch slaughter company. Detected antibiotics residues 
were linked to antibiotics usage information. Twice as much producers with as without 
detected residues reported antibiotics usage. For 89% of deliveries with detected residues ‘no 
antibiotics usage’ was reported. Food chain information about antibiotics usage was too 
unreliable to control absence of antibiotics residues in pork. 
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Introduction 
 
Food safety is an important food attribute for consumers, governments and food business 
operators (FBOs), which has to be further improved constantly. As food safety legislation in 
the EU at the end of the 20th century was insufficiently equipped to do so, the EU adopted 
new food safety legislation with the General Food Law (EFSA, 2007). The new legislation 
states that food safety must be controlled throughout the supply chain starting at primary 
production, FBOs have primary legal responsibility for food safety, and governments keep the 
final responsibility to supervise that marketed products are safe (Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002). If control points for specific food safety hazards are located within a FBO, it can 
use control measures to control these hazards. If, however, control points for a hazard are 
located in production processes of suppliers, buyers have to induce suppliers to control critical 
food safety attributes of the raw materials in order to receive safe raw materials (Van 
Wagenberg et al., 2009). But, safety and quality attributes of raw materials are difficult to 
verify, resulting in information asymmetry about product quality and safety between 
supplying and buying FBOs in food supply chains. A buyer can reduce information 
asymmetry by measuring the food quality and safety performance of suppliers with sampling, 
tests and audits. This can, however, be costly and time consuming (Unnevehr et al., 2004). 
FBOs are, therefore, searching for more cost-effective strategies to measure performance of a 
supplier. Provision of relevant performance information by supplying FBOs to the buying 
FBO can be such a strategy (Van Wagenberg et al., 2009). Performance measurement and 
provision of relevant performance information by a supplying FBO can be attractive for a 
buying FBO and the supply chain, because the supplying FBO has access to his own 
production processes and products, whereas the buying FBO has not, thereby possibly 
reducing total performance measurement effort and costs through less sampling, testing and 
auditing in the supply chain. In this way information provision by supplying FBOs about their 
food safety performance to buying FBOs can cost-effectively improve future food safety. 
Sharing relevant information between suppliers and buyers can improve chain 
performance through better coordination and planning of the supply chain (Lee and Whang, 
2000) and increased customer satisfaction (Eggert and Helm, 2003). However, fear of the 
information being misused (Mohtadi and Kinsey, 2005; Mohtadi, 2008) and expected 
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negative financial consequences (Creane and Davidson, 2008) can result in provision of 
incomplete or incorrect, or unreliable, information. The usage of unreliable information as if it 
were reliable by a FBO, can result in food safety and public health problems. For public 
health and food safety it is, therefore, essential that the information is reliable. 
The legislative framework in the EU for food safety prescribes the use of food chain 
information provided by FBOs in private and public control of animal and public health. All 
FBOs in the EU have to use appropriate hygiene measures and have to keep records from 
which relevant information must, on request, be made available to receiving FBOs and the 
competent authority (Regulation (EC) No 852/2004). They can use this so-called food chain 
information in the official control of products of animal origin intended for human 
consumption (Regulation (EC) No 854/2004). For food chain information to be useful in this 
the control to improve public health and food safety, it is essential that provided food chain 
information is reliable. However, a literature review indicates a lack of literature on the 
reliability of food chain information as prescribed by EU legislation. This research aims to fill 
this gap using the case of information about usage of antibiotics in finishing pigs during the 
60 days prior to delivery to a Dutch slaughter company. 
The paper is organised as follows. First, it is discussed how information provision by 
suppliers used in incentive mechanisms can improve future food safety control on supply 
chain level. Second, the case of food chain information about antibiotics usage in finishing 
pigs is presented. Third, the analysis shows that reliability of food chain information about 
antibiotics usage in finishing pigs, as it is currently implemented, is insufficient to be used in 
controlling the absence of residues of antibiotics in pork and is, therefore, not usable to 
replace the current measuring for antibiotics residues. Finally, the results and reasons for 
provision of unreliable information by the finishing pig producers with a detected residue 
level are discussed to identify possibilities to improve its reliability. 
 
Information provision and incentive mechanisms to improve food safety control 
 
For further improvement of food safety control, new food safety control systems are needed 
with a focus on supply chain level (Van Wagenberg et al., 2009). Regulation (EC) No 
882/2004, prescribing EU member states how to perform official controls, opens possibilities 
to use private control systems in public food safety control, the so-called “verification of 
control”-principle. A government verifies if FBOs’ private control systems sufficiently 
guarantee the safety of marketed products without public control. In this setting FBOs can 
design and implement effective and efficient solutions on supply chain level that further 
improve food safety control. But, this requires new relationships between FBOs within the 
supply chain and between FBOs and government. Van Wagenberg et al. (2009) argue that 
incentive mechanisms between each of the stages in a supply chain can arrange cost-effective 
food safety control on supply chain level that meets future EU-targets for food safety. 
Incentive mechanisms can be private, designed and implemented by FBOs, and public, 
designed and implemented by a government. Incentive mechanisms consist of a performance 
measurement and a performance reward (Figure 1). 
The performance reward, which can be financial and non-financial, provides incentives 
for the supplier to exert effort that improves performance by rewarding favourable food safety 
performance and punishing unfavourable food safety performance. The performance 
measurement includes the indicator which is used to measure food safety performance of the 
supplier, the accuracy of the measurement, and who measures the performance. The 
performance indicator can be related to the product, such as prevalence of a hazard, and to the 
process, such as compliance with rules. Only if an indicator and the buyer’s objective respond 
in exactly the same way to supplier effort, the indicator leads to the best solution for the buyer 
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(Baker, 1992). The accuracy of the performance measurement can provide incentives to the 
supplier to exert effort through the financial consequences of false positives and false 
negatives on the performance reward (Hueth et al., 2007; Starbird, 2007; Van Wagenberg et 
al., 2008). The buyer, an independent third party, and the supplier can measure supplier 
performance. If the buyer himself measures performance, the buyer has the food safety 
performance at his disposal as measured. If performance is measured by an independent third 
party with tests and audits, this party has to provide information about performance to the 
buyer. The independence of the third party is assumed to guarantee that the information is 
reliable, although the quality of the performance measurement can differ between third parties 
due to size and number of standards that the party is accredited to verify (Souza Monteiro and 
Anders, 2009). If performance is measured by the supplier, the supplier has to provide the 
performance information to the buyer. But, the buyer has to rely on the supplier to provide 
reliable information. Fear of the information being misused (Mohtadi and Kinsey, 2005; 
Mohtadi, 2008) and expected negative financial consequences (Creane and Davidson, 2008) 
can result in provision of unreliable information. To determine if supplier provision of 
information is a cost-effective strategy to measure supplier performance, a buyer has to weigh 
the gains of information provision by the supplier against the risks resulting from the 
unreliability of the provided performance information. 
 
 
Figure 1: Elements of an incentive mechanism for food safety control (Adapted from 
Van Wagenberg et al., 2009). 
 
Food chain information about antibiotics usage in Dutch finishing pigs 
 
To prevent antibiotics residues to enter the food chain, the Dutch government implemented 
the National Surveillance Program for the monitoring of antibiotics residues and the slaughter 
company a monitoring system for detection of antibiotics residues. If antibiotics residues are 
detected that exceed allowed residue levels, set by maximum residue limits (MRL) in Council 
Regulation (EEC) 2377/90, the responsible finishing producer is fined. Currently, prior to 
delivery to a slaughterhouse, finishing pig producers in the EU also have to provide food 
chain information about the number of finishing pigs in the delivery, the health status of these 
finishing pigs, the farms the finishing pigs originate from, the usage of antibiotics in these 
finishing pigs, results of analyses on these finishing pigs of interest to food safety and public 
health, and the name of the attending veterinarian (Regulation (EC) No 853/2004). The usage 
of antibiotics is especially interesting, because pigs delivered during the withdrawal period, 
the period after usage of an antibiotic in which the pig is not allowed for slaughter, can result 
in products with too high levels of residues posing a risk for public health (Pikkemaat et al., 
2009). A large Dutch pig slaughter company, therefore, asks delivering finishing pig 
producers to provide information about antibiotics usage during the 60 days prior to delivery. 
If the provided information is reliable, the information ‘did not use antibiotics’ can identify 
deliveries which are very likely without antibiotics residues, because the withdrawal periods 
of the detected antibiotics in finishing pigs are less than 60 days (Table 1). These deliveries 
Incentive mechanism for food safety control 
Performance reward 
• Type of reward 
Performance measurement 
• Indicator to measure performance 
• Accuracy of performance measurement 
• Who measures performance 
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then can be subjected to a light control intensity to detect antibiotics residues, whereas other 
deliveries with the information ‘did use antibiotics’ can be subjected to a tight control 
intensity. But, to increase cost-effectiveness of the measurement for antibiotics residues, the 
information about usage of antibiotics in 60 days prior to delivery must be sufficiently 
reliable. Because, for public health, detection of deliveries with residues is especially 
important, the analysis for the reliability of the provided food chain information about 
antibiotic usage focuses on these deliveries. The indicated usage of antibiotics is expected to 
be higher for the group of producers with a detected residue than for the group of producers 
without a detected residue. Furthermore, it can be expected that with reliable information all 
finishing pig producers with a detected residue indicated antibiotics usage. 
 
Table 1: Withdrawal period of antibiotics found with chemical confirmation in finishing 
pigs delivered to a Dutch pig slaughter company in 2007 and 2008. 
Antibiotic Withdrawal period (days)a 
Doxycycline 5 – 28 
Oxytetracycline 3 – 53 
Tetracycline 3 – 53 
Sulfadiazine 5 – 28 
Sulfamethoxazol 3 – 12 
Dihydrostreptomycine 35 – 49 
Penicilline G 5 – 10 
Tulathromycine 33 
a
 Database veterinary medicines of the Medicine Evaluation Board of the Netherlands 
(http://www.cbg-meb.nl/CBG/en/veterinary-medicines/database-veterinary-
medicines/default.htm). 
 
Material and method 
 
Residues of antibiotics 
 
Finishing pigs with residues of antibiotics were obtained from a dataset with screening results 
on residues of antibiotics in finishing pigs in 2007 and 2008 of a large Dutch pig slaughter 
company. The dataset contained screened finishing pigs from multiple slaughter locations. 
For each slaughter location, screened finishing pigs were selected randomly from deliveries of 
finishing pigs from farms that had double the lung lesion incidence and pleurisy incidence 
compared to the average of all farms delivering to that slaughter location. The dataset 
contained screening results of 22,633 finishing pigs; 11,490 in 2007 and 11,143 in 2008. 
Residues of antibiotics were determined with the three-step method described in Pikkemaat et 
al. (2009). First, a Nouws Antibiotics Test-screening (NAT-screening) on pre-urine kidney 
fluid was carried out. Second, if the NAT-screening indicated the possible presence of 
antibiotics, two post-screening test on meat juice (NAT-meat test) and on kidney juice (NAT-
kidney test) were performed simultaneously. Third, if one or both of the post-screening tests 
indicated the possible presence of antibiotics, a chemical confirmation with an EU-validated 
method (Commission Decision 2002/657/EC) was conducted on meat. 
 
Information about the usage of antibiotics 
 
For 141 finishing pigs from the dataset with screening results (93 in 2007, 48 in 2008) 
chemical confirmation showed residues of antibiotics. Of 45 of the finishing pigs with a 
chemical confirmation (31 in 2007, 14 in 2008) the laboratory, which conducted the chemical 
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confirmation, only reported compliance with the MRL without reporting the measured 
quantitative residue level. The results from these pigs were excluded from the analysis, 
because lack of information about the measured quantitative residue level could also mean 
that the level was zero, i.e. no residues. The 96 finishing pigs with a quantitative residue level 
were from 74 producers, of whom 61 producers had one delivery with one positive finishing 
pig, 12 producers had two deliveries with one positive finishing pig in each delivery, and one 
producer had 11 finishing pigs in nine deliveries (two deliveries with each two positive 
finishing pigs). The producer with the nine deliveries was excluded from the analysis, because 
he was subjected to intensified surveillance and excluded from delivery to the slaughter 
company in 2008. This resulted in 85 deliveries with each one positive finishing pig in each 
delivery to be used in the analysis. 
Delivery documents (also called transport documents) provided information about the 
antibiotics usage in the finishing pigs in a delivery. Prior to delivery, for each delivery of 
finishing pigs arriving at a slaughterhouse the finishing pig producer must fill out a delivery 
document. By signing the delivery document, a finishing pig producer declares he filled out 
the receipt truthfully. In 2007 and 2008, different delivery documents concerning treatment 
statements about antibiotics usage during the 60 days prior to delivery existed. Of the 85 
deliveries with a positive finishing pig, 60 delivery documents contained a statement about a 
group treatment, 22 about treatment of individual finishing pigs, and three did not include a 
statement. These last three were excluded from the analysis, resulting in 82 deliveries. 
The deliveries without residues were selected from the deliveries of the 22,492 screened 
finishing pigs without a chemical confirmation (11,397 in 2007 and 11,095 in 2008). A 
sample of 397 deliveries without residues was randomly selected for analysis using an 
arcsinus-transformation (Cohen, 1977), because the delivery documents were only available 
on paper. This sample size allows for detection of statistical difference of 5% point between 
the percentage of finishing pig producers who indicated antibiotics usage in the sample with a 
quantitative residue level on the one hand and in the sample without a quantitative residue 
level on the other hand, with a power of 0.95 and an alpha of 0.01 (Cohen, 1977). To exclude 
a possible bias in slaughter location, year and season, the number of deliveries from each 
slaughter location, year and month in the sample of deliveries without residues was set 
proportional to the numbers in the sample of the deliveries with residues. Of the deliveries 
without residues 299 delivery documents included a statement about a group treatment and 98 
about treatment of individual finishing pigs. 
 
Statistical analysis 
 
The Pearson chi-square test of goodness of fit (Pearson, 1900) was used to test if the 
percentage of finishing pig producers who indicated antibiotics usage was higher for the 
group of producers with detected antibiotics residues than for the group of producers without 
detected antibiotics residues for all treatment statements. 
A finishing pig producer, however, could have correctly indicated no group treatment with 
antibiotics, even if a pig in a delivery was found to have antibiotics residues, because he could 
have treated only this individual pig. A separate analysis was, therefore, conducted for 
deliveries with only statements about treatment of individual pigs on the delivery document. 
Because of the low number of deliveries, more than 25% of the expected cell counts had a 
value of less than five, a Pearson chi-square test of goodness of fit was not appropriate 
(Fingleton, 1984) and instead a Fisher’s exact test (Agresti, 1992) was performed to test if the 
percentage of finishing pig producers who indicated antibiotics usage in individual pigs was 
higher for the group of producers with detected antibiotics residues than for the group of 
producers without detected antibiotics residues. 
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If antibiotics residues were detected with chemical confirmation, it can be expected that 
the finishing pig producer reported ‘did use antibiotics’ on the delivery document. So, the 
expected number of delivery documents with ‘did not use antibiotics’ would be zero. It is, 
however, possible that for a delivery with residues the delivery document correctly reported 
‘did not use antibiotics’ during 60 days prior to delivery, because it can not be excluded that 
an individual pig is found to have antibiotics residues at slaughter, even when the finishing 
pig producer did comply with the withdrawal period. This is because withdrawal periods are 
set based on probabilistic analysis of medicine clearing times in experiments and for an 
individual pig the medicine clearing time could exceed 60 days. In other words, it is not 
possible to univocally set the expected number of delivery documents reporting ‘did not use 
antibiotics’ in the deliveries with residues at zero, but it is expected to be low. The expected 
number of delivery documents reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’ was (reasonably but 
arbitrary) set at 10% of the 82 delivery documents found with residues of antibiotics, which is 
eight. A Pearson chi-square test of goodness of fit was used to compare the real number of 
delivery documents reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’ to the expected number of delivery 
documents reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’. Setting the expected number of delivery 
documents reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’ at 20% (16) or 30% (25) yielded similar 
empirical results. 
 
Results 
 
Table 2 provides the number and percentage of finishing pig producers with and without 
detected antibiotics residues reporting ‘did use antibiotics’ and ‘did not use antibiotics’ during 
60 days prior to delivery. The percentage of finishing pig producers who indicated usage of 
antibiotics was twice as high for the group of producers with a detected residue (11.0%) as for 
the group of producers without a detected residue (5.5%) (p=0.0686). Using the statements 
about treatment of individual finishing pigs yielded comparable results (p=0.4066). The 
majority of delivery documents of the 82 deliveries with a finishing pig with a detected 
antibiotic residue (89.0%) and of the 22 deliveries with a finishing pig with a detected residue 
exceeding the MRL (86.4%) did report “did not use antibiotics” prior to delivery. The real 
number of delivery documents indicating “did not use antibiotics” (73 of 82 deliveries) in 
deliveries with residues was significantly higher than the expected eight (p<0.001). 
 
Table 2: Number (n) and percentage (%) of deliveries of finishing pig producers to a 
Dutch slaughter company in 2007 and 2008 with the producer reporting ‘did use 
antibiotics’ and ‘did not use antibiotics’ in the finishing pigs during 60 days prior to 
delivery for deliveries in which residues of antibiotics were and were not detected per 
type of treatment statement. 
 Delivery documents reporting  
 ‘did use antibiotics’ ‘did not use antibiotics’ Total 
Deliveries n % N % n 
Statements about group treatment and treatment of individual pigs 
Without antibiotic residue 22 5.5 c 375 94.5 397 
With antibiotic residue a 9 11.0 c 73 89.0 82 
 - Under MRL b 6 10.0 54 90.0 60 
 - Exceeding MRL b 3 13.6 19 86.4 22 
    Statements about treatment of individual pigs 
Without antibiotic residue 6 6.1 d 92 93.9 98 
With antibiotic residue a 2 10.0 d 18 90.0 20 
a
 Based on chemical confirmation. 
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b
 Maximum residue limit. 
c
 Statistical difference with Pearson chi-square test of goodness of fit with p = 0.0686. 
d
 Statistical difference with Fisher’s exact test with p = 0.4066. 
 
Discussion 
 
The analysis shows that 89% of finishing pig producers with detected antibiotics residues 
indicated no usage of antibiotics in the pigs during the 60 days prior to delivery to a Dutch 
slaughter company. This shows that the provided food chain information ‘did not use 
antibiotics’ is no guarantee for the absence of antibiotics residues in pork, and that this 
information is unreliable. The food chain information about antibiotics usage in finishing 
pigs, as it is currently implemented in the EU-legislation, can not replace the current sampling 
and testing for antibiotics residues to control the absence of antibiotics residues in pork. 
The non-compliance to provide correct information about antibiotics usage hampers 
control of antibiotics residues in pork. For food chain information about usage of antibiotics 
in finishing pigs provided on delivery documents to be useful, its reliability needs to be 
increased and non-compliance to be decreased. Non-compliance for provision of reliable 
information can be due to errors, because of lack of knowledge or concern, or deliberate 
actions (Elffers et al., 2003). It was not possible to assess whether or not finishing pig 
producers with detected antibiotics residues accidently or deliberately reported ‘did not use 
antibiotics’. But, the reasons for the presence of antibiotics residues can be an indication. The 
reasons were identified through telephone and email contact of slaughter company personnel 
with the 73 finishing pig producers with detected antibiotics residues. Of 47 (64%) of these 
producers reasons for presence of antibiotics residues were retrieved (Table 3). Most reasons 
provided seem related to errors: cross-contamination with medicated water and feed, 
forgetfulness about the withdrawal period, incorrectly recording and marking of medicated 
pigs, and the sickness of treated pigs. This is supported by the fact that 73 of the 74 producers, 
who had deliveries with a pig with antibiotics residues in 2007 and 2008, had one or two 
deliveries with a pig with residues. The non-compliance with the presence of antibiotics 
residues thus seems mainly related to errors instead of deliberate actions. However, 
accidentally providing antibiotics in the 60 days prior to delivery by itself does not prevent 
deliberately reporting ‘did not use antibiotics’, because a finishing pig producer could have 
detected the accidental provision of antibiotics prior to filling out the delivery document. 
 
Table 3: Reasons provided by 47 finishing pig producers for the presence of residues of 
antibiotics in their deliveries to a Dutch finishing pig slaughter company in 2007 and 
2008. 
Reason Number of deliveries 
Cross-contamination through water 2 
Cross-contamination through feed 10 
Incorrectly adjusted feeding system 2 
Forgot to close tap of medicated water 5 
Forgot to record the use of antibiotics correctly 4 
Forgot the withdrawal period 12 
Medicated finishing pigs accidently in the delivery 6 
Treated finishing pigs were sick 8 
  Total 49 a 
a
 Two finishing pig producers provided each two reasons. 
 
 8 
To improve compliance with the law to provide correct food chain information about 
antibiotics usage, factors that induce non-compliance have to be solved. To analyse 
compliance with regulatory laws of Dutch primary producers the Table-of-Eleven (T11) can be 
used (Elffers et al., 2003). The T11 includes six spontaneous compliance dimensions and five 
induced compliance dimensions promoting and opposing compliance with a law (Elffers et 
al., 2003). The spontaneous compliance dimensions, which are not under direct control of a 
law-enforcing agency, include lack of knowledge about and clarity of rules, costs and benefits 
associated with compliance and non-compliance, acceptability of rules, general conformity 
with respect to laws and authorities, informal control by the social environment, and 
spontaneous detection. The induced compliance dimensions, which focus on activities of a 
law-enforcing agency, include the probability that an arbitrary producer will be controlled 
(control density), the conditional probability of detecting non-compliance given that a non-
compliant producer is checked (control depth), targeting of control activities towards 
producers with increased risk of non-compliance, sanction certainty if non-compliance is 
detected, and sanction severity. Most finishing pig producers did provide correct information, 
indicating that the spontaneous compliance dimensions sufficiently induced them to comply 
with food law. Further improvement of compliance could come from increased knowledge 
and clarity about the rules. Specifically, some finishing pig producers, who provided reasons 
for a detected residue, seemed to have interpreted the 60 day period in the question on the 
delivery document as the (usually shorter) withdrawal period. Concerning the induced 
compliance dimensions, in practice in the period considered in this research only the National 
Surveillance Program for the monitoring of antibiotics residues and a private monitoring 
system of the slaughter company for antibiotics residues were in place. Although mentioned 
in Regulation (EC) No 854/2004, laying down specific rules for usage of food chain 
information in the official control of products of animal origin intended for human 
consumption, the reliability of the provided food chain information about antibiotics usage 
was not actively enforced. A sanctioning system on the provision of incomplete and incorrect 
information could improve reliability of the provided information. A sanctioning system 
could be implemented to improve reliability of the provided information. However, for cost-
effective control, benefits of such a system in terms of public health improvement should 
outweigh cost of control and sanctioning. Difficulty for the government or a slaughter 
company to verify actual antibiotics usage by finishing pig producers and relating this to the 
information provided on the delivery documents, would probably result in high costs. Further 
research is needed to determine the benefits and costs of such a system and to design it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper showed that the food chain information provided by finishing pig producers about 
the usage of antibiotics during the 60 days prior to delivery to a Dutch finishing pig slaughter 
company, as it is currently implemented in the EU-legislation, was unreliable, did not provide 
useful information to control the absence of residues of antibiotics in pork, and can not be 
used as performance measure in an incentive mechanism to control the absence of antibiotics 
residues in pork. A sanctioning system could be implemented to improve reliability of the 
provided information. Further research is needed to determine whether the benefits of such a 
system outweigh its costs. 
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